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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellees concur generally with the Issues Presented for 
Review and the Standard of Review as set out by appellants. 
However, with regard to the constitutionality of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, as questioned by issues I and II, as set out in 
appellant's brief, we would direct the court's attention to its 
holding that legislative enactments receive a strong presumption 
of validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there 
is no reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as 
conforming to constitutional requirements. Authority: In re 
Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct. No. Cs-1. 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 
1988) . 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in. the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
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Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 11 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended 
Section 63-30-11 
(1) A claim arises when the state of limitations that would 
apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written 
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim 
is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
2 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) The damages incurred by the claimant so far 
as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person 
making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal 
guardian, and shall be directed and delivered to the responsible 
governmental entity according to the requirements of Section 63-
30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned 
at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court 
to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service of notice 
of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, 
the court shall consider whether the delay in serving the notice 
of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in 
maintaining its defense on the merits. 
Section 63-30-13 
A claim against a political subdivision or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
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authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time 
granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees accept the Statement of the Case with regard to 
Nature, Proceedings, and Disposition as stated by the plaintiff 
with the following additions. 
Plaintiff indicates that Mr. Thomas S. Taylor, the prior 
counsel in the case, made numerous attempts to communicate with the 
defendants. He subsequently wrote a letter dated September 12, 
1989. The notice period for filing a claim expired on September 
11, 1989. Furthermore, defendant James R. Mathis, the airport 
manager for Provo City, did not receive any of the telephonic 
communications alleged to have been made by plaintiff. See Record 
at 54-55. 
Plaintiff claims that he was unable to file a notice of claim 
against defendants until we had responded to his letter of 
September 12, 1989, with our letter of December 5, 1989. See 
Record at 15-16. The plaintiff's letter asks for information 
regarding insurance and our response simply stated that we did not 
have copies of that insurance on file. Plaintiff's claim, as well 
as his complaint, alleged inter alia, that the claim or complaint 
was based on defendants' failure to enforce and require compliance 
with city, state and federal regulations concerning the safety and 
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airworthiness of Warren's aircraft. See Record at 1-8, 11-14. 
Both the notice of claim and the complaint went well beyond 
defendants1 response to plaintiff's letter and could therefore have 
been alleged in a more timely manner. The trial court states that 
plaintiff's notice of claim filed on March 30, 1990 was clearly 
untimely. The court further added: 
. . . that plaintiff's own negligence prohibited him from 
filing a timely notice of claim; however, even assuming 
that defendants intentionally concealed the insurance 
policies noted by plaintiff, such concealment did not 
prevent plaintiff from filing an adequate notice of claim 
within the statutory period. 
Record at 62. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the notice 
of claim provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et seq. 
(hereinafter referred to as Governmental Immunity Act), are 
constitutional. The notice of claim provisions serve legitimate 
legislative objectives and purposes. The vast majority of courts 
that have considered this issue have found such provisions to be 
constitutional and not in violation of either equal protection or 
due process provisions of federal or state constitutions. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act creates a means by which 
a citizen can sue the government for wrongs which they believe they 
have suffered. It creates remedies as opposed to taking them away. 
It clearly does not violate the open courts clause of the Utah 
Constitution. It does require a notice of claim to be made within 
one year from when the claim arises, but allows a person to then 
sue the governmental entity if the matter is not resolved. If a 
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person fails to comply with the procedures of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, they are left without a remedy, but that is true with 
all procedural mandates and is not unusual or singular with the 
Governmental Immunity Act, 
Plaintiff argues that the discovery rule should be applied to 
the circumstances of this case. Whether or not the discovery rule 
is considered in this case, it is not relevant to the disposition. 
Plaintiff should have discovered his cause of action well before 
the running of the one-year notice period. His allegations 
indicate that he claims many matters beyond the scope of the brief 
discovery that he conducted. All of this indicates that he could 
have filed a timely claim had he been diligent. This court should 
find, as did the trial court, that plaintiff was negligent and 
therefore the discovery rule is inapplicable. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION OR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
A, Utah has Upheld the Notice of Claim Provision as 
Constitutional• 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the majority of courts in 
the United States in holding that the special notice of claim 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are valid and 
constitutional, holding that such laws serve legitimate legislative 
objectives and purposes. See 18 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §53.152 (3d 
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Ed. 1984). In Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977), this 
court considered the very same issues presented in appellant's 
argument in this case. This court stated: 
While aware that some state courts have invalidated 
similar notice of claim requirements, holding that they 
violate equal protection, this court is not prepared to 
do so, finding rational basis for the classification. 
Id. at 193. In making the statement, this court considered some of 
the cases cited by appellant in his brief, namely: Hunter v. North 
Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975); Turner v. 
Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973); and Reich v. State 
Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). 
This court has continued to follow the holding of Sears, in 
every case where the issue has been raised since 1977. In Madsen 
v. Borthick, this court stated: 
Section 63-3 0-11 sets out a notice requirement, and 
Section 63-30-12 spells out the effect of failing to 
comply with the requirement. Section 63-30-11 provides 
that before a plaintiff may maintain an action against 
the state, he or she must file a notice of claim with the 
appropriate state entity. Section 63-30-12 provides that 
an action against the state is barred if the required 
notice is not filed. It therefore makes failure to give 
notice grounds for dismissal. A plan reading of those 
sections indicates that no suit against the state may be 
maintained if notice is not given. We therefore conclude 
that service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
769 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1988). While Madsen involved a suit 
against the state of Utah, Section 63-30-13 parallels the 
provisions of Section 63-3 0-12 but applies them to subdivisions of 
the State of Utah such as the City of Provo. 
As recently as May of 1991, this court has recognized the 
validity of the notice of claims requirement. In Standard Federal 
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Savings & Loan Association v, Kirkbridef 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 6 
(1991), this court in discussing the legislature's ability to cut 
off claims, gave as an example, Section 63-3 0-13 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act which provides, that "a claim against a 
political subdivision . . . is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed . . . within one year after the claim arises . . . ." 
(Emphasis in original.) 
B. There is no Trend Toward Holding Notice of Claim 
Provisions Unconstitutional. 
Appellants would have this court believe that there is a 
strong trend towards finding notice of claims provisions in 
Governmental Immunity Acts unconstitutional based on due process 
and equal protection. Such is not the case. Since this court 
considered this specific issue in Sears in 1977, only two 
additional jurisdictions were cited by plaintiff that were not 
cited by the decision in Sears. See Miller v. Boone County 
Hospital, 394 N.W.2d 776 (Iowa 1986) and OfNeil v. City of 
Parkersburq, 237 S.E.2d 504 (W.Va. 1977). In 1978 the Colorado 
Supreme Court considered a similar issue in Fritz v. Regents of 
University of Colorado, 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978). The court 
recognized that a provision similar to that in our Governmental 
Immunity Act did result in the establishment of two different 
classes. There are those persons who are damaged by a tort 
committed by a public entity and also those persons damaged by a 
tort committed by a private person. However, the court rejected 
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the appellant's argument that such a distinction is 
unconstitutional. The court stated: 
Absent a "suspect" classification or infringement upon 
a fundamental right, both of which are absent here, our 
analysis of a statute attacked on equal protection 
grounds depends upon whether the statute rationally 
furthers the legitimate state interest. 
Id. at 25. (Citing San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). 
The court noted that the notice requirement rationally 
furthers legitimate state interests. 
Those interests include fostering prompt investigation 
while the evidence is still fresh; repair of any 
dangerous condition; quick and amicable settlement of 
meritorious claims; and preparation of fiscal planning 
to meet any possible liability. 
Id. The court also notes that in light of the number of public 
entities, the notice of claims provision provides: " . . . certain 
means by which the state or its subdivisions may be alerted to 
potential liability arising from a governmental activity." Id. 
Plaintiff argues that these same reasons could be applied to 
private tort-feasors and for some reason, are therefore invalid. 
The fact that a valid legislative purpose in enacting one statute 
might be applied in a different case, does not make the 
justification invalid. 
It should be noted that private tort-feasors such as 
businesses are free to choose what services they provide and can 
structure their operations to avoid or minimize tort liability. 
Governments, however, are generally not free to choose the services 
they provide, but must provide essential government services such 
as police and fire protection, etc. Additionally, governments are 
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accountable to the people, who may replace government officials if 
the government is not responsive or abusive of the immunity that 
has been granted to them. These considerations combined with the 
fact that businesses are motivated by profit are reasons for a 
separate and distinct classification for government in regard to 
immunities. 
The Colorado Supreme Court also rejects as being contrary to 
the weight of judicial authority, the rationale espoused in the 
cases relied upon by appellants (Reich v. State Highway Department, 
Turner v. Staggs, Hunter v. North Mason High School, and O'Neil v. 
City of Parkersburg) (citations omitted). 
The federal circuits that have been confronted with this issue 
have also held that notice of claim provisions do not violate due 
process or equal protection. In Grimes v. Pearl River Valley Water 
Supply District, 930 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit, 
considering a Mississippi statute, faced an argument from the 
plaintiffs in that case that the provision violated the equal 
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 
The court, citing cases in the Third and Tenth Circuits, held that 
the immunity statute does not violate the equal protection clause 
of the Constitution. Using a rational basis test, the court stated 
that plaintiffs had not shown how this scheme was irrational and 
the court added, ". . .we cannot conceive how they could meet this 
burden." Id. at 444. The court also found that the Mississippi 
statute did not violate the due process clause even though in that 
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case plaintiffs did not have a right to sue the government agency 
involved under the Mississippi Governmental Immunity Act. The 
court said: 
• . . even if there were a protected property interest, 
plaintiffs were not deprived the process that was due 
them. They had plenty of opportunity to contest the 
sovereign immunity scheme during the legislative process. 
A legislature provided all the process that was due. 
Id. In our case, the appellant's due process rights are much less 
restricted than under the Mississippi scheme. In Utah, plaintiffs 
had a right to sue the municipality, but were merely required to 
file a notice of claim as a condition for bringing that suit. It 
should also be noted that the Utah statute allows one year in which 
to bring the notice of claim. In the four principal cases relied 
upon by plaintiff, where the courts held that the notice 
requirements were unconstitutional, the period allowed to bring the 
notice was much shorter. In O'Neil, 237 S.E.2d at 506, the period 
allowed to bring the notice of claim was only 30 days. In Miller, 
394 N.W.2d at 776, a person had to commence a lawsuit within six 
months or have sent the written notice of claim within 60 days from 
the injury. Reich, 194 N.W.2d at 702, also involved a 60-day 
notice provision. Finally, in Hunter, 539 P. 2d at 846, the 
Washington statute allowed 120 days in which to bring a formal 
notice of claim. While the decisions in these cases did not 
necessarily evolve around the shortness of the notice period, it 
may well have been a factor in the total consideration of the 
court. 
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In their brief, plaintiff relies heavily upon two Utah Supreme 
Court cases. The first, Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech AircraftP 717 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), deals primarily with the Utah Constitution 
article I, section 11, the open courts clause. (See II below.) 
However, the issue in that case was the constitutionality of a 
statute of repose. Such a statute is not an issue in this case. 
The second case that plaintiff relies heavily upon is Condemarin 
v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). Plaintiffs can 
find no comfort in the Condemarin case. The issue before the court 
in that case was the constitutionality of the cap or recovery 
limits set within the Governmental Immunity Act. The holding was 
very narrow and dealt only with the fact that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to the University Hospital. The court 
discussed the historical unfairness of the Doctrine of Governmental 
Immunity. However, this "unfairness" has been remedied in Utah by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Act provides a means by 
which aggrieved citizens can sue the government. There is nothing 
within the Condemarin case that would indicate that the notice of 
claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act violate 
either equal protection or due process. 
In regards to fundamental fairness, judicial immunity presents 
the same "unfairness" problems as governmental immunity, the Courts 
realized and held that to perform their crucial judicial function, 
immunity is necessary. Likewise, governmental immunity is 
necessary for governments to perform their crucial governmental 
functions. 
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In Mountain Fuel SUDPIV V. Salt Lake City, 752 P. 2d 884 (Utah 
1988), this court held that based upon its past decisions, the 
standard of scrutiny applied under article I, section 24, of the 
Utah Constitution, met or exceeded that mandated by the fourteenth 
amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the 
federal courts. Therefore, if a statute passes muster under 
article I, section 24, it will also pass federal muster. Id. at 
890. The test established in that case was whether the 
classification of those subject to legislation was a reasonable one 
and bore a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a 
legitimate legislative purpose. This court has already held in 
Sears, that there is a rational basis for the classification and 
treatment of the different types of tort victims discussed by 
plaintiff in his brief. 
It is a well-established rule that legislative enactments 
are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and 
will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no 
reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as 
conforming to constitutional requirements. (Citation 
omitted.) In evaluating constitutional challenges to 
statutes, the court looks to "reasonable or actual 
legislative purposes" rather than to "any conceivable 
reason for the legislation," Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661, 671 n. 14 (Utah 1984) , and will construe statutes 
to "effectuate the legislative intent" while avoiding 
interpretations that conflict with relevant 
constitutional mandates. (Citation omitted.) 
In re Criminal Investigation, 7 Dist. Ct. No. Cs-1, 754 P.2d 633, 
640 (Utah 1988) . 
It is clear from the holdings of this court cited above and 
from the vast majority of other courts that have considered this 
issue that there is a rational basis for requiring the Notice of 
Claim provisions within Governmental Immunity Act. The one-year 
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notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are 
constitutional and should continue to be upheld by this court. 
II 
THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS NOT 
VIOLATED BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Appellants in their brief have completely misread or 
misunderstood the requirements of the Open Courts Clause of the 
Utah Constitution. Article I, section 11, requires: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11. 
Plaintiffs cite the two-part analysis set out in Berry and 
reiterated in Condemarin which states: 
First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his 
constitutional interest . . . . Second, if there is no 
substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of 
the remedy or cause of action may be justified only if 
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated 
and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not 
an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 680; Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 357-58. 
The second portion of this test only arises in a situation 
where the legislature has taken away some legal right. An example 
often used is the right of an employee to sue their employer. When 
the legislature established that provision, they also established 
workers compensation which satisfied this two-pronged test. In 
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this case there is no interference, limitation or abrogation of any 
existing right. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was created in 
order to provide a means for citizens with complaints and 
grievances to sue the government. It did not abrogate or eliminate 
such a right. Appellant complains that plaintiff has lost his 
existing remedy but remains without recourse to an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy. There is no requirement to provide 
an alternative remedy if there is a satisfactory initial remedy. 
In this case, there is an initial remedy which is filing a notice 
of claim within one year. Plaintiff's dilatory conduct which 
resulted in his failure to file a claim within one year is the 
reason that the remedy is lost. Since the first part of this two-
part test is not at issue, the second part also does not become a 
question of relevance in this case. 
In Cruz v. Wright, 765 P. 2d 869 (Utah 1989) , this court stated 
that nowhere in this state's jurisprudence is it suggested that 
article I, section 11, flatly prohibits the legislature from 
altering or even abolishing certain rights. 
In fact, in Berry we specifically stated that the 
legislature may eliminate or abrogate a cause of action 
entirely if there is sufficient reason and the 
elimination or abrogation "is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means [of] achieving the objective." 
Cruz, 765 P.2d at 871. 
In Argument I above, the cases set out there show that this 
court has found that the notice of claim requirement is not 
arbitrary or unreasonable in achieving the objectives of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
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Plaintiff also cites Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1991), as a case supporting their 
position. First of all, this case once again involves a statute 
of repose, which is not at issue in our case. In Wrolstad. the 
statute of repose acted to cut off plaintiffs right of recovery 
and was therefore found to be invalid. However, the court stated: 
The legislature clearly has power to alter the form of 
or to limit Wrolstad's compensation for his disease. 
However, to satisfy the open courts provision, the 
legislature cannot effectively preclude all compensation 
without providing an equivalent alternative remedy. 
Wrolstad has no alternative. 
Id. at 245. 
The facts of our case do not give rise to the kind of analysis 
done in Wrolstad or Berry. In the case of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, the legislature has not effectively precluded all 
compensation. It has provided an alternative remedy. The 
alternative is to file an appropriate notice of claim within one 
year of when the claim arises. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
notice of claim provisions clearly do not violate the open courts 
clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Ill 
PLAINTIFF 18 BARRED FROM RECOVERY FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY 
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISION OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
A. Plaintiff's Notice of Claim was Untimely. 
The alleged tort in this case occurred on or before September 
10, 1988. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that a 
person having a claim for injury must file a notice of claim. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1953). Failure to file a written notice of 
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claim with the city within one year after the cause of action arose 
bars the claim. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985). 
Plaintiff filed a notice of claim on March 30, 1990. Refer to 
Exhibit 3, Record pages 11-14. Utah Code Ann., § 63-30-13 (1953), 
requires that a claim against a political subdivision of the state 
must be filed with the governing body of the political subdivision 
within one year after the claim arises or the claim is barred. In 
this case, the claim arose on or before September 10, 1988. A 
claim would have to have been filed not later than September 11, 
1989 in order to be timely. The notice of claim filed by plaintiff 
on March 30, 1990, was clearly not timely. In Madsen, this Court 
concluded that service of the notice of claim was a precondition 
to suit. 769 P.2d at 249. The trial court in this case reviewed 
the facts and the law and concluded that plaintiff's notice of 
claim was clearly untimely. See Record at 62. 
Plaintiffs defend their untimely claim by alleging that they 
attempted to make numerous telephone inquiries to Provo City during 
the summer of 1989. Record at 27-3 6. In neither of these 
affidavits do the affiants claim that they ever made contact with 
Mr. James Mathis, who was the airport manager of Provo City. To 
the contrary, Mr. Mathis states that the first contact he had with 
Mr. Tom Taylor, then the attorney for plaintiffs, or anyone else 
associated with the Warrens, was a letter dated September 12, 1989. 
See Exhibit 1, Record at 54 and 55. Mr. Taylor did write a letter 
to Mr. Mathis dated September 12, 1989, asking about the insurance 
carried by the Western Flying Club, who had leased the plane to the 
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Warrens, See Record at 16. After receiving the letter, Mr. Mathis 
contacted the City Attorney, Gary Gregerson, who then made contact 
with the Western Flying Club by letter dated September 19, 1989. 
See Record at 50. Mr. Gregerson did not receive a response to his 
letter to the Western Flying Club, so on December 5, 1989, he 
responded to Mr. Taylor. See Record at 15. 
There is no indication that Provo City or any of its employees 
attempted to avoid responding to any inquiries concerning this 
case. Provo City had no reason to believe that it would ever be 
a defendant in this case. Mr. Taylor's letter of September 12, 
1989, was clearly not a notice of claim. See Record at 16. The 
inquiry from plaintiff's counsel only involved whether or not 
Western Flyers Club had filed a copy of its insurance with the 
Airport Manager. Failure of the "club11 to do so, or of Provo City 
to require such could not have been a cause of the subsequent 
accident in Nevada. There was no motive to delay plaintiff from 
gaining information. Furthermore, Provo City does not avoid or 
delay responding to inquiries from citizens for any such reason. 
Plaintiff knew he had been in a plane crash on September 10, 
1988. Counsel knew, or should have known, that the statute 
required a notice of claim to be filed within one year from the 
date the cause of action arose. Plaintiff's counsel did not file 
a claim until March 30, 1990, over six months late. His initial 
inquiry for information was made on September 12, 1989, after the 
statute had run. Appellants argue that they had no way of knowing 
that Provo City was a potential defendant until Provo City 
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responded to counsel's letter on December 5, 1989. The statute, 
however, does not allow a plaintiff to sit on his rights until 
after the year has run and then begin discovery only to find out 
that perhaps a cause of action might exist. That is what occurred 
in this case. Counsel for plaintiffs indicated that he attempted 
numerous times in June, July and August to contact Provo City. 
However, he never reduced these inquiries to writing until after 
the time to file a notice of claim had expired. Furthermore, the 
person with whom he needed to contact in Provo City, Mr. Mathis, 
indicates that he did not receive any of these telephone inquiries. 
See Record at 54 and 55. 
B. The "Discovery Rule" Does Not Help Plaintiff. 
Appellants rely heavily upon the case of Myers v. MacDonald, 
635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 1981), which involves a situation where 
plaintiffs were unaware that their ward had been killed in an 
accident until after the statute of limitations had run. In that 
case there was no "triggering mechanism" to cause them to seek out 
information to see if their ward had been killed. In this case, 
however, there was the plane crash which occurred on September 10, 
1988. All statute of limitations regarding the flying clubs and 
others began to run on that date. Plaintiffs had an affirmative 
obligation to seek out all information that might identify who was 
responsible for their accident. Any cause of action that might 
accrue against defendants in this case, should have been discovered 
during that period of time and a timely notice of claim made by 
September 11, 1989. 
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1. Plaintiff was Dilatory in his Discovery Efforts. 
The Myers case creates two exceptions to the normally 
very rigid rule regarding statutes of limitations. One exception 
is the discovery rule whereby the statute does not begin to run 
until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of 
action. Plaintiffs rely on this rule to justify their untimely 
notice of claim. Of course, the court emphasizes that mere 
ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent 
the running of the statute. That is the situation here. Plaintiff 
had a year from the date of the accident to file a claim. Counsel 
did not make a written inquiry for information about insurance 
until after the statute had already run. This is clearly a 
situation where counsel's ignorance of an alleged cause of action 
was caused by counsel's own dilatory behavior in not making written 
inquiry at an earlier time. Appellants cite Foil v. Ballinqer, 
where the court said: 
To say that a cause of action accrues to a person when 
she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time, 
that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be 
expected to have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon 
her is patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She cannot 
maintain an action before she knows she has one. To say 
to one who has been wronged, "you had a remedy, but 
before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law 
stripped you of your remedy" makes a mockery of the law. 
(Emphasis added.) 
601 P.2d 144, 148-9 (Utah 1979). This case merely restates the 
discovery rule as subsequently cited in the Myers case. Once 
again, however, as in the Myers case, mere ignorance does not 
excuse a timely filing. Here the court uses the phrase, "can 
reasonably be expected to have knowledge" as a caution to 
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plaintiffs. In the case of the Governmental Immunity Act and its 
requirement that a claim be filed within one year, a person cannot 
bide their time until that period has run, then seek information, 
and then decide to file a claim. Even though the discovery is made 
after the one year has run, the person could reasonably have made 
such inquiry long before the one-year period expired. In this 
case, plaintiffs admit that they began to seek information as early 
as June of 1989. However, their efforts were less than meager. 
A letter written in June of 1989, would have established a time 
frame from which valiant efforts of discovery began. 
2. Defendants Did Not Cause Plaintiff to File an 
Untimely Notice of Claim. 
The second exception created in the Myers case deals with 
the situation where a potential defendant intentionally conceals 
information or misleads the potential plaintiff. See Forsman v. 
Forsman, 779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989). Counsel for plaintiff in this 
case has alleged that defendants intentionally concealed facts in 
this case. There is absolutely no evidence of such concealment. 
To the contrary, Provo City has nothing to conceal. The affidavit 
of Mr. Mathis (see Record at 54-55) indicates that the first time 
he heard from counsel for plaintiffs was when he received the 
letter in September, 1989. If this information was vital to 
plaintifffs ability to file a claim against Provo City then an 
earlier written inquiry would have been normal procedure. A 
personal appearance by plaintiff or his counsel would also have 
been appropriate considering that filing a timely claim is a 
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precondition to filing a suit. Counsel failed to do either. There 
is no indication that any "behavior" by Mr. Mathis delayed 
plaintiff in any way. 
In making allegations of wrongdoing on the part of defendants, 
appellants in their brief state: 
A question arises over whether defendant Mathis1 concern 
was the legal liability rather than providing information 
to the plaintiff in a timely fashion. One might ask why 
defendant Mathis did not reply to the numerous telephonic 
inquiries and why he did not respond to the plaintiff's 
correspondence personally. 
Appellant's Brief at 35. 
In his affidavit (see Record at 54-55) Mr. Mathis indicates 
that he did not receive any telephonic inquiries from Mr* Taylor 
or any of the plaintiffs in this case. Plaintiffs did not write 
to Mr. Mathis, but their counsel was the one who wrote the letter 
dated September 12, 1989. See Record at 16. Mr. Mathis, quite 
correctly, immediately referred the matter to his attorney, the 
City Attorney, who then immediately sought the information 
requested. See Record at 50-53. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants should not be allowed to 
avail themselves of the "Notice" defense because of their own 
misconduct. See Rice v. Granite School District. 23 Utah 2d 22, 
456 P.2d 159, 24 and 26 (1969). That case stated that where the 
delay in commencing the action is induced by the conduct of the 
defendant it cannot be availed by him as a defense. Id. at 163. 
Based on all of the foregoing facts, there was no conduct on the 
part of the defendant that prevented plaintiff from commencing his 
action. The letter of September 12, 1989 only inquired concerning 
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whether or not the flying club had insurance. See Record at 16. 
The response only answered the question of whether or not the 
flying club had insurance. See Record at 50. Nevertheless, when 
they filed their claim, they made numerous other allegations. See 
Record at 10-13. If they were able to make these other allegations 
on March 26, 1990, without seeking any other information, why 
couldn't they have done so prior to September 11, 1989, before the 
time for filing a claim had run? The only answer is that they were 
negligent and dilatory. 
C. The District Court Followed the Law Established by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
This court has consistently held that the filing of a notice 
of claim is a precondition to filing a subsequent lawsuit. See 
Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P. 2d 295 (Utah 1988) . The court also holds 
that failure to file notice of claim within one year after the 
cause of action arose bars the claim. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 
P.2d 276 (Utah 1985). The district court in considering all of the 
facts and law in this case reached the same conclusion. (See 
Record at 62; also see Addendum to this Brief, which is the Order 
of Judge Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial District Court, in the 
companion case, where he also concluded that plaintiffs1 attempt 
of notice of claim was untimely). 
CONCLUSION 
In his conclusion, plaintiff states, "this case presents to 
the Utah Supreme Court a question of whether the plaintiff Warren 
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deserves to have his day in court." In point of fact, he does not. 
Violation of rules of procedure can bring harsh results, including 
dismissal of lawsuits. However, it should be noted that plaintiff 
will have his day in court against the other defendants in this 
case, including the lessor of the aircraft, the insurance company 
of Mr. Warren, and the Nevada Airport that provided fuel to the 
aircraft just prior to the crash. 
This court, along with the majority of other courts who have 
considered the issue, have found that a notice of claims provision 
does not violate federal or state constitutional rights to equal 
protection and due process. The rational basis for this statute, 
which supported the conclusion in Sears, remains unchanged today. 
This court in decisions as recent as 1991, continues to uphold the 
validity of the notice of claim provisions in the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Plaintiffs have misinterpreted the requirements of the open 
courts clause of the Utah Constitution. No right has been taken 
away from plaintiff so that there is no need for an alternative 
remedy. Plaintiff had the right to sue Provo City. However, in 
order to do so, plaintiff was required to file a timely notice of 
claim. Plaintiff failed to do so and therefore his case was 
dismissed by the district court. Plaintiff had one year in which 
to file the notice of claim, which is more time than allowed in 
many other jurisdictions that require notice of claim, including 
the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which 
allows six months. 
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Plaintiffs attempt at a notice of claim in this case was not 
timely. Plaintiffs argue that they were diligent in their pursuit 
of information and therefore they should be entitled to the 
discovery rule. However, the discovery rule is inapplicable in 
this case because plaintiffs were in fact dilatory and negligent 
and the rule clearly states that a plaintiff's mere ignorance of 
the facts does not constitute lack of discovery. According to the 
facts as presented by affidavits from plaintiff's former counsel 
and his secretary, they made "numerous" telephonic inquiries in 
June, attempting to gather information. A prudent attorney may 
have made a written inquiry to the airport manager at this time. 
After more telephonic inquiries in July without success, almost any 
attorney would have made written inquiry (and remember that the 
timely notice of claim expired on September 11th). After alleged 
further telephonic inquiry in August, what does plaintiff's counsel 
do? He allegedly made additional telephonic inquiries in early 
September. Only after the time to file a notice of claim had 
expired does counsel write his letter. Plaintiffs claim that this 
was acting "in all diligence" is clearly inconsistent and the 
discovery rule is not applicable under these facts. The district 
court so found in this case as did the district court in the 
companion case. Both cases were dismissed for failure of 
plaintiffs to file a timely notice of claim. The ruling of Judge 
Harding dismissing the lawsuit for failure to file a timely notice 
of claim should be affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
GWEN E. WARREN, et al., FINDINGS & RULING ON 
DEFENDANTS PROVO CITY AND 
Plaintiff, JAMES R. MATHER'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
-vs-
Case No,: 910400252 
PROVO CITY CORP., et al., 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Defendant. 
********** 
This matter is before the Court on Provo City's and 
James R. Mathis' Motion To Dismiss. The Court having read the 
entire file and particularly the defendant's Memorandums in 
support of the Motion To Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion To Dismiss, and having read the cited 
cases by the parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
makes the following Ruling and Order. 
FINDINGS 
1. Plaintiffs were involved in an airplane crash in 
Nevada on September 10, 1988. 
2. Plaintiffs contend their counsel made numerous 
telephone calls to Provo City offices during the months of 
June, July, and August of 1989 asking if Western Flyers Flying 
Club had been required to comply with Provo City Ordinance No. 
13.13.060. (See affidavit of Thomas S. Taylor.) Plaintiffs 
further allege through the affidavit of Peggy Maciel (Secretary 
to Thomas S. Taylor, Esq.) that she made telephone calls during 
the months of June, July and August of 1989 to the Provo City 
Mayor's Office and to James R. Mathis' office regarding 
Insurance required to be maintained by Western Flying Club. 
Both affiants allege that they did not get the necessary 
information and phone calls were not returned. Defendant James 
R. Mathis alleges, by affidavit, he never received a telephone 
call or any messages that Thomas S. Taylor, Esq. wanted him to 
call Mr. Taylor. (See James R. Mathis affidavit.) 
3. Thomas S. Taylor, Esq. wrote a letter to Mr. 
Mathis, dated September 12, 1989, requesting copies of 
insurance policies that exist or existed on September, 10, 1988 
on Western Flying Club. (See Exhibit #1 to defendant's 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss.) 
4. Gary L. Gregerson, Esq. responded to Mr. Taylor's 
letter on December 5, 1989. (See Exhibit #2 to defendant's 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss.) 
5. Plaintiffs filed a Notice Of Claim Of Injury And 
Damage with the defendants on March 30, 1990. (See Exhibit #3 
to Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss.) 
6. Defendants denied plaintiffs' claim on April 27, 
1990. (See Exhibit #4 to Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of 
Motion To Dismiss.) 
7. Plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act (U.C.A. section 63-30-13 et seq.) 
which required the filing of a Notice Of Claim within one year 
from the date the claim arises, or the claim is barred. (See 
U.C.A. section 63-30-11.) Notice requirement is a 
pre-condition to a law suit. (Madsen v Borthick, 769 P2d 245 
(Utah 1988)(Madsen A) 
8. Plaintiffs contend application of the "Discovery 
Rule" is appropriate to overcome the unjust effects of the 
statute of limitations, and cite several cases in support of 
their contentions. This Court does not find the cited cases to 
be controlling in this case as such cases are distinguishable 
from the facts of this case. 
9. Plaintiffs had both the knowledge and the 
opportunity to timely file an adequate Notice Of Claim with the 
defendant Provo City Corporation. Plaintiffs were aware of 
Provo City Ordinance No. 13.13.060 prior to the expiration of 
the one year period from the date of the crash of September 10, 
1988. Plaintiffs have alleged that Provo City's failure to 
enforce that ordinance constitutes negligence on the part of 
the defendants and thus are liable to plaintiffs for 
plaintiffs' injury and damages. The failure to have copies of 
insurance policies on hand is only one of the alleged breaches 
of the ordinance. (See Thomas S. Taylor's affidavit and 
Plaintiffs' Notice Of Claims Of Injury And Damages.) 
10. The Court finds no evidence of defendants 
intentional concealment of the failure of Western Flyers Flying 
Club to file copies of its insurance policies with defendants, 
and even assuming such intentional concealment, such 
concealment did not prevent plaintiff from filing a timely and 
adequate Notice Of Claim. 
RULING 
1. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is granted. 
2. Counsel for defendants is directed to prepare an 
order consistant with the above, and submit the same to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to 
the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, UT this 13th day of June^ 
"BY THEyCOt 
PARKr JUDGE 
cc: Wayne B. Watson 
David C. Dixon 
